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1. Introduction
The common law doesn’t clearly spell out who has property in a found item X, which is
contained in Y. When there is a dispute over such an item, the court often awards the item to the
finder. But not always. Sometimes the court awards X to the owner of Y. The decision hinges on many
different matters of fact, such as whether the owner of Y knew about X, or whether X is a wild or
domesticated animal, or whether X was lost or mislaid, or how small the weight of X is relative to Y (as
compared to its value), or whether the finder was an employee of the owner of Y, to name a few.
We tend to think that property begins when someone finds a resource lying free for any taker,
or as Carol Rose puts it, property originates in a “quintessential moment of chutzpah: the act of
establishing individual property for one’s self simply by taking something out of the great commons of
unowned resources” (Rose 1994, p. 9). No one seems to have to teach two‐year‐olds the well‐known
adage of “finders, keepers;” they instinctively assert it all on their own. Wilson (2020), however, argues
property originates elsewhere, not in a moment of chutzpah, but in a moment of creation.
On this account, property began in humans when humans began creating composite tools,
something not in the great commons of unowned resources. Only humans create composite tools, a
feat of nature which is possible only because humans think in abstract thought. A point hafted to a shaft
is more than three pieces of the natural world in close physical proximity. The pieces form a whole that
did not previously exist in the great commons of unowned resources. There are not three things, nor
merely a sum of three things, but one newly created thing—an abstraction for a whole class of
purposeful things called a “spear”. Humans perceive such a creation physically in three dimensions. It
has an interior, an exterior, and boundary between the two. But we also perceive it with abstract
thoughts, such as something made by someone with self‐directed purposes, something that someone
goes hunting with, and something that someone calls “mine”.
Tools are also, whether composite or simple, an extension of an organism’s body. We
assimilate tools as part of our body so as to feel the world through them. When hammering a nail, our
minds organize the sensations such that we feel, not the handle vibrating in our palm, but the hammer
striking the nail. Our minds treat the hammer as being a very part of our body. The “I” that is in my
body is also in the hammer. What happens when I put down the hammer? Am I still in it? Hypothesis:
Yes. Our abstract minds continue to put an abstract idea of ourselves in the tool. This thing is mine. We
take the concept “I” in my body and place it in the tool as the concept “mine” (Wilson 2020, p. 119).
More specifically, Wilson (2020) hypothesizes that humans universally cognize property as being
contained in a thing.
An important feature of such abstract thought is that it is tied to the physical world. What is
mine extends from the interior of the tool to its surface, but it does not cross the boundary to the
external world. An implication of such abstract thinking is that if the tool physically contains the concept
of mine, then where the tool goes in the physical world, so goes the concept of mine with it.
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Wilson (2020) conjectures such thinking explains why a certain linguistic convention emerges in
English jurisprudence during the sixteenth century.1 When Sir Edward Coke summarizes The Case of the
Swans from 1592, he uses the phrase have property in eight times, as in “a man hath not absolute
property in any thing which is ferae naturae, but in those which are domitae naturae” (Coke 1600, p.
238). Because such a sentence sounds quaint to us moderns, we are likely to read over the little words
in the sentence, specifically, the prepositions, when making sense of it. Why do Coke and others that
follow him, including, for example, John Locke, Sir William Blackstone, and Adam Smith, use the phrase
property in Y? Because, as the conjecture goes, the word in reflects and reveals the unconscious
principles of how property works in chattels. The property is in the thing. Our minds locate property as
being in the thing. Related phrases remain in active modern use. In the property law courses, professors
regularly say things like “have title in” or “have the greatest interest in”.2 The title or greatest interest is
in a thing. Where the thing goes, so goes our title or greatest interest in the thing. The point of this is
to say that human beings locate property inside a thing. We cognize property by perceiving the physical
world with an abstract quality of property being in a thing and knowing thereby what such containment
refers to in ordinary business of life.
Wilson (2020) proposes that thinking about property this way can help us discover a simple,
ecologically rational rule for settling found property disputes: If A has property in Y and X is in Y, then A
has property in X in Y, even if B finds X. I say that the rule is ecologically rational in the Smith (2003)
sense of using
reason—rational reconstruction—to examine the behavior of individuals based on their
experience and folk knowledge, who are “naive” in their ability to apply constructivist
tools to the decisions they make; to understand the emergent order in human cultures;
to discover the possible intelligence embodied in the rules, norms, and institutions of
our cultural and biological heritage that are created from human interactions but not by
deliberate human design. (p. 470)
This study entails, first, rationally reconstructing from several legal cases “the emergent order”
of how people based on their own “experience and folk knowledge” would solve the problem of
a found property dispute. The proposed rational reconstruction of a simple rule is then put to
an experimental test. Importantly, this article subjects the rule to a test that has the potential
reverse the interpretation of a prior experiment.
One reason why the common law is unclear about found property disputes may be that
there is no “intelligence embodied in the rules” by which people would solve such disputes from
their “cultural and biological heritage.” Judges are thus tasked with articulating, case by case, as
best they can, the principles they used for settling each particular found property dispute. In
other words, there is no room in the common law to improve the efficiency of the case law.
Another reason why the common law is unclear may be that, as the judges follow the windy
path of precedent, they fail to see a collective intelligence embodied in how people would solve
1
2

The convention’s Latin origins go back at least another 300 years (Wilson 2020, pp. 92‐93).
See notably, for example, Honoré (1961, p. 107).
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such disputes. Perhaps the happenstance order of the specific cases locked the courts into
particular decisions and blinded them from seeing a general abstract rule around which to
organize subsequent decisions. If that is the reason why the common law is unclear, then there
is room to improve the efficiency of settling such disputes. For a clear general rule could be one
way to reduce the costs of found property disputes by avoiding litigation from the very
beginning.
2. A Selection of Found Property Disputes
Traditional views on the origins of property, e.g., John Locke’s, do not distinguish created
objects like tools from naturally occurring things like seashells.3 Children at a young age, however,
distinguish between the two as something they expect or don’t expect to “belong to” someone. When
presented with new objects, three‐year‐old children say that toy trucks and forks to “belong to”
someone, but leaves and seashells do not (Neary et al. 2012). Parents do not explicitly teach their
children such distinctions about things and ownership. They pick it up all on their own from their
observations of the world.
An episode of the British animated children’s show Bing illustrates. The episode “Not Yours”
opens with Flop and his preschool charge Bing making a visit to Padgett’s corner shop to purchase some
groceries and a snack (Bing 2015). While Flop pays for their comestibles, Bing wanders about and finds a
box of lollipops on the far wall. Lured by its sweetness, he picks one up, opens it, and takes a lick. When
Flop’s call to leave the store interrupts his enjoyment, Bing slips the treasure into his pocket. Notice
what the cartoon teaches and what it assumes about their viewers when Bing takes out the lollipop and
begins licking it on their way home:
Flop: Oh, what have you got there, Bing?
Bing: Mmm. A lollipop. It’s strawbry.
Flop: Where did you get that from?
Bing: It’s mine. I found it in the shop.
Flop: Ah, and did we pay for the lollipop?
Bing: Uh, no.
Flop: Oh, well . . . if we didn’t pay for it, I’m afraid it must still belong to Padget.
Bing: Oh, can we keep it?
Flop: Well no, Bing, it’s not yours.
Bing: Why not?
Flop: Well, if you take something without paying for it, that’s not right, is it? It’s called stealing.
It’s natural for children to claim things found in what appears to be the great commons of life as “mine.”
What preschoolers need to be taught is that “finders, keepers” does not apply to things inside a grocery
store. Created things like lollipops belong to other people; they do not lie free like acorns for any taker.
You must give something in order to take a lollipop home with you.

3

See Wilson (2020, chs. 2 and 6) for more specifics on how this theory of property relates to Locke’s famous labor
mixing explanation.
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Firstness in property matters in two ways. We put property in things we are the first to grasp in
the great commons of unowned resources.4 Once claimed, we perceive such things with a new abstract
feature. It is “Mine!” All the other things in the great commons of life lack such a property. Firstness
also matters when we create things not originally in the great commons of unowned resources. Human
beings put themselves in their tool creations, which is to also say we put property in the things we
create. Our minds cognize property is being located in the things we create.
But what happens when we stumble across something created, something that we recognize as
not naturally occurring in the great commons? We learn at a young age—like Bing learns from his
mentor Flop—that such things generally “belong to” someone else. Someone put themselves into their
creation, and at the quintessential moment of creation it was no longer a point, shaft, and some haft.
The puzzle for found items is, why does a created thing which someone generally calls “Mine!”
appear to be in the great commons and not inside Padgett’s shop? Created things, by and large, are
found inside containers that someone also calls “Mine!” (That’s not right, is it? It’s called stealing.) But
if there is no container which someone has property in, and if there is no person around to claim the
created good as “Mine!”, our minds reclassify the object as lying free for any taker. “Finders, keepers”—
first in hand—once again applies.
Firstness thus matters for a found item X, but not priorly so. The prior test is whether someone
has property in the container Y in which X is found. Firstness matters only when no one has property in
Y which contains X. In such cases first in hand or the creation of X is decisive. But if someone has
property in Y, then that person has property in X in Y, even if someone else found X. Several well‐known
and a few lesser known property cases explain what I mean and why it does not depend on any other
matters of fact. Table 1 chronologically lists the eight cases I discuss below and summarizes the found
item X and the Y in which X was found.
Table 1. Who Has Property in X Which was Found in Y?
X
Case*
jewel
Armory v. Delamirie (1722)
Pierson v. Post (1805)
fox
parcel
Bridges v. Hawkesworth (1851)†
McAvoy v. Medina (1866)
pocketbook
Haslem v. Lockwood (1871)
manure in piles
$165
Durfee v. Jones (1877)†
two $50 bills
Bowen v. Sullivan (1878)†
several $100 bills
Jackson v. Steinberg (1949)
*
Bold indicates who the Court ultimately ruled for.
†
Wrongly decided according to the proposed rule

Y
unknown
public beach
shop
barbershop
public highway
safe
bale in facility
drawer in hotel room

Did someone have property in Y?
If not, who has firstness in X?
No, Armory (first to grasp)
No, Pierson (first to grasp)
Yes, Hawkesworth
Yes, McAvoy
No, Haslem (first to create)
Yes, Durfee
Yes, Bowen
Yes, Steinberg

4

In a short story about two children who sequentially play with a ball, two‐year‐olds respond to the question
“Whose ball is it?” by saying the first child to play with the ball (Friedman and Neary 2008).
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Figure 1 summarizes how to determine if someone has property in X, which is in a Y, for eight
property disputes in Table 1. For the 3 cases on the right side of Figure 1, neither disputant has property
in the container Y in which X was found. Firstness in creation of grasping of X would thus be the rule for
settling the dispute. For the 5 cases on the left of Figure 1, X was found inside a container Y in which
someone did have property: a shop, a barbershop, a safe, a bale in a facility, and a drawer in a hotel
room. According to the proposed rule, firstness in finding X would not determine who has property in
the found item. The disputant who had property in the container Y would have property in the found
item X.
The three disputes on the right side of Figure 1 all involve an X which was not found in a Y that
someone had property in. In the first case, Amory v. Delamirie (1722), a chimney sweeper’s boy found a
jewel in an unknown location and took it to the defendant to determine what it was. The defendant
took out the stone and returned the setting to the boy.5 The case is traditionally interpreted as the
precedent for a right to possess accruing from the fact of possessing (Birks 2000). My interpretation is
that a jewel is a created good, something that someone claims property in, and if there is no one around
to claim the property in the jewel, nor a container Y to claim the property in X in Y, the first to grasp the
ring puts their property in it.

Figure 1. Who has Property in a Found Item X, which is in Y?
*
†

5

Bold indicates who the final court ruled for.
Wrongly decided according to the proposed rule.

Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange 505 (1722), The English Reports (1378–1865) 93.
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In Pierson v. Post (1805), two fox hunters contested who had property in a dead fox.6 Who has
property in a fox on an unowned beach? Post, who had been tracking the fox, had also put a bullet in it,
but had not yet secured the prey, or Pierson, who knew Post was pursuing the fox but was indeed the
first to kill the fox and grasp it with his very hands? The justice of the peace awarded the fox to Post on
account of Post’s pursuit and the downright un‐neighborliness of Pierson to interlope. The New York
Supreme Court reversed the decision citing Blackstone, Pufendorf, Grotius, and Justinian I. From time
immemorial the custom had been that to claim property in a wild animal a hunter must take its natural
liberty by either killing or trapping it.
The Connecticut Supreme Court also overruled a trial court in Haslem v. Lockwood (1871).7 In
this case Haslem and his employees raked eighteen piles of horse manure to the side of a public
highway. With night approaching, they left the piles intending to return the next day to haul them
away. Lockwood happened to see them the next day and asked a warden if anyone had asked for
permission to rake and take the manure. Hearing no one had, Lockwood made haste and by noon had
hauled the piles to his fields. This case is traditionally interpreted as a classic example of Locke’s labor
mixing theory of property. My interpretation slightly differs. Because manure doesn’t appear in neat
piles in the great commons of unowned resources, Haslem had created something, and by doing so
Haslem had thereby put property in the piles of manure.
Firstness solves such cases because no one had property in Y in which X was found. We shall see
that someone having property in the container Y in which is X found can likewise serve as a clear,
ecologically rational rule for solving property disputes. Such a rule, however, is at odds with how courts
have several times ruled when taking numerous other factors into consideration to award X to the
finder.
When our minds abstractly locate property as inside a thing, the property ends at the boundary
between the interior and the exterior of the thing. The mixing is not between our labor and a thing, but
between our abstract notion of property and the inside of the physical thing. Notice how the principle
of accession in animals neatly conforms. If Jacob has property in a pregnant ewe, then he also has
property in the ewe’s lamb before and after its birth. The property in the ewe is likewise in the lamb
which grows from inside the ewe.
The same abstract principle for things that procreate can likewise be applied to nonliving things
that someone has property in. The plaintiff in Durfee v. Jones (1877) bailed a safe to the defendant,
Jones, to use while selling on his behalf (see the left side of Figure 1).8 Jones found $165 inside the wall
inside the safe. Who has property in the found money? The finder, Jones, who also had possession of
the safe? Or, Durfee, who had property in the safe itself but did not know about the money inside the
wall? The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled, following Armory, that “the general rule undoubtedly is,
that the finder of lost property is entitled to it as against all the world except the real owner, and that
ordinarily the place where it is found does not make any difference.” But the place does matter, albeit
in the negative, in both Pierson and Haslem. If Post had been hunting foxes on his own land, Pierson,
without permission from Post to be there, would not have a case. Lockwood, likewise, could not go
onto Haslem’s land to pile and haul away manure. The boundary matters. I might add, moreover, that
6

Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (New York Supreme Court 1805).
Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 (Connecticut 1871) 500.
8
Durfee v. Jones, 11 (Rhode Island 1877) 588.
7
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the place where the boy found the jewel is conspicuously absent from the court record and decision in
Armory.
Such a precedent has consequences one year later when Durfee serves as the case more nearly
in point for Bowen v. Sullivan (1878).9 Sixteen‐year‐old Quinn (Sullivan’s half‐sister and guardian) found
an envelope from a bale of rags and paper on the floor of a mill owned by Bowen. Inside the envelope
were two $50 bills. The Indiana Supreme Court awarded the money to the finder, not Bowen who had
property in the bale and in the mill. Why? In Durfee, “the purchase was of the safe, not the safe and its
contents, the money was not embraced in the purchase,” and so here Bowen did not purchase the bale
“embracing” the money in the envelope. Furthermore, even though Bowen did buy a bale of paper and
rags, and money is paper, “their existence was unknown when the envelope was purchased, and their
weight was so infinitesimally small, compared with their value.” Thus, because he did not know that he
was buying two $50 bills, “it is unreasonable,” the court concludes, to propose that Bowen had property
in the money in the bale in the mill.
With such presumption in favor of finders, it is not surprising, then, for a chambermaid to claim
money she found while at work cleaning a hotel room. “Finders, keepers,” she thought. The decisive
fact for the Oregon Supreme Court in Jackson v. Steinberg (1949) was not the simple, clear fact that
Steinberg had property in the dresser in the room in the hotel where the money was found, but rather
that his employee, Jackson, “was simply performing the duties her employment.”10 Jackson
counterclaimed the money she found as treasure trove because it was hidden or concealed. In rejecting
the treasure trove argument, the court determined that because the money was “concealed carefully
under [a] paper lining of [a] dresser drawer in [a] guest room,” the money was not lost to an unknown
owner, but rather mislaid. Why this fine distinction matters, every first‐year American law student
learns, is because of two prior cases—Bridges v. Hawkesworth (1851) and McAvoy v. Medina (1866)—
which set the precedents for all of the cases on the left side of Figure 1.11
In 1847 Bridges found a small parcel of banknotes on the floor of Hawkesworth’s shop as he
was leaving. When no one claimed the money, the two contested who could claim property in it.
Bridges, the finder, or, Hawkesworth, the person who had property in the shop in which the parcel was
found? The original judge awarded the item to Hawkesworth, but Bridges appealed to the Queen’s
Bench which both affirmed Armory and rejected the reasoning of the “learned judge” as “mistaken in
holding that the place in which [the banknotes] were found makes any legal difference.” The Queen’s
Bench noted that if Bridges had picked up the parcel outside the shop, by Armory Bridges would
“clearly” have property in the parcel. So why would a few yards inside the shop matter? Because, I
would say, boundaries in general matter to our minds. If outside the boundary clearly matters to the
court, then inside the boundary matters too, maybe not legally but cognitively. Otherwise, outside is not
outside a thing and inside, not inside a thing.
The boundary of place of business appears to have mattered to the original judge in the
American case of McAvoy v. Medina. By Bridges, the judge was bound to award a wallet on a counter in
a barbershop to its finder, McAvoy, and not the proprietor, Medina. But the judge didn’t rule that way.
9

Bowen v. Sullivan, 62 (Indiana 1878) 281.
Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 (Oregon 1949) 129.
11
Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 21 (Law Journal, Queen’s Bench 1851) 75, 15 The Jurist 1079.
McAvoy v. Medina, 11 Allen (Massachusetts 1866) 548.
10
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He noted that whereas in the case of Bridges the parcel appeared to be lost, the pocketbook in this case
was not “to be treated as lost property” but rather mislaid in case the original owner returned to
proprietor for it. Such a fine distinction, divining the intentions of an unknown person by the mere
physical facts of location of the thing, wouldn’t be necessary if courts had used a clear physical boundary
to settle such disputes and espoused a simple rule: if A has property in Y, and a found item X is in Y, then
A has property in X in Y, even though B found X.
In what follows, Wilson (2020) and I use a three‐dimensional virtual world experiment to test
how ecologically rational it is for people to follow such a rule for settling found property disputes. Prior
work reports the results of three treatment conditions testing this simple rule but leaves untested a
crucial fourth treatment condition that would complete a 2 x 2 experimental design. This article reports
the results of the crucial fourth treatment condition in the context of the other three to further test the
claim that our minds locate property inside a thing. The fourth treatment condition is what Mayo (1996)
calls a severe test. It has the power to rule out flaws from inferring the central claim of the prior
experiment. The flip side is that the treatment condition can also completely reverse the central
conclusions of the prior experiment.
3. Experimental Design
The experimental design is motivated by Durfee v. Jones. Three facts of the case are just too
ripe not to model an ex ante test of the theory: (1) A has property in Y, (2) Y is in B’s possession, (3) B
finds X literally inside a wall inside of Y. If the participants in the experiment reject the prediction that
people say that A has property in X in Y in such a severe test, then there is good cause to reconsider the
theory. On the other hand, if the results of the experiment strongly support the prediction, then the
aim is to test of the boundaries of the theory by introducing counterfactual conditions to Durfee v.
Jones—specifically, B having property in Y holding all else constant—to further establish social scientific
causes. If the results are mixed, then the whole design is up for reevaluation.
There are three types of actors in the three‐dimensional virtual world: Red, Blue, and Observers.
Red and Blue are modeled after Durfee and Jones, respectively. Three Observers view the entire
interaction between Red and Blue, and when, without warning, Blue finds X from inside Y they then
decide to whom to award X, Red or Blue. Each Observer privately decides to whom X should be
awarded knowing that if they are in the majority decision, they will be paid $20 (cash) but $0 if they are
in the minority. The beauty contest is meant to model a judge discovering what the community would
think is the right decision and not only their own preference for awarding the item.
Figure 2 displays a bird’s eye view of the virtual world. In the baseline condition, Red, under the
control of a participant, walks to the bottom right side of the figure to withdraw a box from the
dispenser. The avatar then walks over to the sorting station at the top right of the figure. When Red lays
down the box, two yellow and one black token roll out. Red’s task is to sort the yellow and black tokens
in the bins at the top of the figure. Each yellow token generates $0.50 for Red. The black token is worth
nothing. After Red has sorted the tokens, the avatar picks up the box and hands it to Blue, who is under
the control of another participant, on the other side of the wall. Blue’s task is to wash the box out of the
view of Red on the other side of a further wall over which Red cannot see. Once Blue has washed the
box, the avatar delivers the box to the robot on the left side of the screen. The robot asks whether the
box is clean and ready for recycling. Blue must click “Yes” before the robot takes the box and pays Blue
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$2.00 for the box. Blue can keep $1.50 of the $2.00 and gives the remaining $0.50 to Red to complete
the round. Notice that both avatars have something to do and that at the end of the round each person
has earned $1.50.
This scene is repeated a total of five times. On the sixth round, everything proceeds as before
until Blue gives the box to the robot. The robot in this last round lays the box on the table and a purple
token rolls out from inside. The robot says, “Blue, there was a purple token in the box. It has a cash
value of $25.00. Is it yours, or is it Red’s?” Blue must either click “Yes, it is mine” or “No, it is Red’s.”
After Blue decides, the robot takes the purple token over to Red and asks whether it is theirs or Blue’s.
Red then makes an analogous decision.
Up until this point, the Observers watching everything that happens. They then receive the
following instructions:
There was a purple token in the box.
Red says it is theirs/Blue’s.
Blue says it is theirs/Red’s.
Your task is to decide whether the purple token is Red’s or Blue’s. You will be paid $20.00 only if
at least one of the other two observers agrees with you. Otherwise, you will receive $0 if you
are in the minority.
The majority of observers will decide who actually gets the purple token (and its cash value of
$25.00).
The Observers’ decision is final, and notice, they do not know what the parties claim when they make
their decision. By design, we will be able to see how many Red‐Blue pairs actually have conflicting
claims, and even for those pairs who may not be in conflict, the Observers are still deciding behind a veil
of ignorance who gets the purple token (for real salient cash). The interested reader can view a video
demonstration of the experiment here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wo0yreinUDQ.
In the baseline condition, the instructions refer to the box as “Red’s box.” I will refer to this
baseline treatment condition as the “Red’s box‐Red first grasps the box” condition. The prediction is
that the Observers award the purple token to Red even though Blue finds the purple token while the
box is in Blue’s possession.
In the next treatment condition, the entire experiment proceeds in the same way except that
the instructions refer to the box as “Blue’s box.” This condition is called the “Blue’s box‐Red first grasps
the box” condition. The prediction is that the Observers award the purple token to Blue because Blue
has property in the box.
The third condition is the “Blue’s box‐Blue first grasps the box” condition. In this treatment
condition, Blue first grasps the box from the dispenser and then washes it before Red sorts the tokens.
Red then gives the box back to Blue to sell to the robot. Blue is thus the owner of the box and is in the
possession of the box when he finds the purple token. The prediction here is that the Observers award
the purple token to Blue because Blue has property in the box, possession of the box, and finds the
purple token in the box.
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The fourth condition not conducted by Wilson (2020) completes the 2 x 2 design and is called
the “Red’s box‐Blue first grasps the box” condition. Without this condition it is unknown whether the
first‐to‐grasp effect primarily explains how panels award the found item in this experiment and thus
supports the proposed rule for settling found property disputes. Or, maybe the interaction effects of
what Red and Blue do severely qualify the first‐to‐grasp effect so as to call the proposed rule into
question. Or maybe the first‐to‐grasp effect robustly explains how panels award the found item, but
that interaction effects for what Red and Blue do also matter in a minority of panel decisions. Figure 3
summarizes the complete 2 x 2 design.

Figure 3. 2 x 2 Experimental Design

The participants for the experiment were recruited from the general undergraduate student
body of Chapman University. They had all participated in one prior experiment of some kind, but no
subject participated in this experiment more than once. A session consisted of ten people, five men and
five women, who were randomly seated in a computer laboratory to generate two groups of five
people. I conducted twenty independent groups of five people for one treatment condition. Wilson
(2020) conducted forty independent groups of five people for the first treatment condition and twenty
independent groups of five people for two other treatment conditions. The total number participants is
500 (= 100 + 400).
Each participant received $7 for showing up on time, plus what they earned in the experiment.
Observers earned either $20 or $0 in additional money. Reds (Blues) earned either $33.50 ($7.50) or
$8.50 ($32.50), depending on to whom the Observer panel awarded the purple token. The participants
read self‐paced instructions and were free to ask questions at any time. The experiment lasted for
approximately twenty to twenty‐five minutes of the one hour for which they were recruited.
4. Results
Figure 4 reports the results for the three prior treatment conditions when both Red and Blue
claim the purple token from inside the box. Each observation is the majority decision of a three‐person
Observer panel. Out of the 40 Red‐Blue pairs in the “Red’s box‐Red first grasps the box” treatment
condition, 26 of them conflicted, and of those 26 conflicts, the Observer panels award the purple token

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3537740

13
to Red 20 times.12 Such a finding is quite agreeable to the prediction (z = 2.65, p‐value = 0.0041, one
proportion, one‐tailed test [p0 = 0.5]).13 The court’s decision in Durfee runs counter to how a statistically
significant supermajority of people think about the settling the dispute.

Figure 4. To Whom do the Observer Panels Award the Purple Token
When Both Red and Blue Claim It?

The finding for the “Blue’s box‐Red first grasps the box” treatment condition, however, is not
agreeable, if the prediction is that because Blue has property in the box, Blue then has property in the
purple token found in the box. Seven of the ten Observer panels award the purple token to Red, a mere
seven percentage points less than the prior treatment condition (z = 0.43, p‐value = 0.3336, two
proportions, one‐tailed test). The Observers appear to not take the experimenter’s word that the box is
Blue’s.
For that reason Wilson (2020) conducted the “Blue’s box‐Blue first grasps the box” treatment
condition. After being confronted with the disconfirming evidence from the “Blue’s box‐Red first grasps
the box” treatment condition, he hypothesized that the Observers were not following the prompt in the
initial treatment’s instructions that the box was Red’s. Now the critic might say that this means that the
experiment failed to test the treatment that it was designed to test, and thus the experiment is a failure.
Such a conclusion, however, would cut our learning short, for it fails to ask why the participants did what
they did. It would ignore what the participants in the “Blue’s box‐Red first grasps the box” are trying to
12

DeScioli and Karpoff (2015) pay 59 volunteers 20 cents to read a summary of the Durfee v. Jones case and decide
who should have received the money found in the safe. They find that 47 of them (80%) side with Durfee.
13
Wilson (2020, ch. 8) reports that a small change in the experiment text for half of the 40 pairs has no effect on
the results. Figure 4(a) pools the results as one bar.
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tell to us. We learn as much, if not more from our failures in the laboratory, than our successes. Such is
one value of randomly assigning participants to experimental conditions. Social scientists build
laboratory models of the world, to paraphrase Ludwig Wittgenstein, to work on ourselves, our
interpretations, our way of seeing things, our expectations of the participants. It is when our
participants disabuse us of our predictions that we are invited to see the world differently and learn
something new.
In working through our incorrect expectations of the world in this experiment, we face what is
known as the Duhem‐Quine problem.14 Because the empirical evaluation of the hypothesis is a
composite test of several auxiliary assumptions or hypotheses, does the disconfirming evidence testify
against the hypothesis itself or against some assumption in this specific implementation of the empirical
test? The results of the first two treatments may seem to point to the latter, but we don’t know unless
we conduct another two treatment conditions deliberately designed to isolate the source of the
disconfirming evidence in the “Blue’s box‐Red first grasps the box” treatment.
To design new treatment conditions we need to ask the question, what could Red be doing such
that the Observers think that Red is the owner of the box? By design Red does just three things: pull a
box from the dispenser, sort the tokens in it, and hand the box over to Blue. One hypothesis is that, by
the theory in the introduction, the Observers treat Red as the owner of the box because Red is the first
person to grasp the object from the dispenser.
To test that hypothesis directly, Wilson (2020) conducted the “Blue’s box‐Blue first grasps the
box” treatment condition, and voilà! 100% of the panels award the purple token to Blue. The switch is
from 70% for Red in the “Blue’s box‐Red first grasps the box” treatment condition to 100% for Blue in
the “Blue’s box‐Blue first grasps the box” treatment condition (z = 3.28, p‐value = 0.0005, two
proportions, one‐tailed test). The evidence is strongly convincing that whoever has property in Y, also
has property in X in Y. The proviso to the finding is that the Observers don’t take the experimenter’s
word for who has property in Y. Whoever first grasps Y is the person who has property in Y and
therefore property in X which was found in Y.
But a crucial question remains to sort out the disconfirming evidence from “Blue’s box‐Red first
grasps the box” treatment. What happens in the fourth case (the missing bottom‐left cell in Figure 4)
when the instructions say that the box is Red’s, but Blue first grasps it from the dispenser? We do not
know what happens when we move from “Red’s box‐Red first grasps the box” in Figure 4(a) to “Red’s
box‐Blue first grasps the box”.
We can imagine three types of results and two very different conclusions from completing the 2
x 2 experimental design:
Case (1): Comparing the top‐right and the bottom‐right cells in Figure 4, the avatar who is first
to grasp the box explains the 70‐percentage point swing from 30% Blue to 100% Blue (“Blue’s box‐Red
first grasps the box” to “Blue’s box‐Blue first grasps the box”). If this is likewise true for the left two cells
in Figure 4, then we could expect a 70‐percentage point swing from “Red’s box‐Red first grasps the box”
to “Red’s box‐Blue first grasps the box”, or a final split of 7% for Red and 93% for Blue by the Observers
in the “Red’s box‐Blue first grasps the box” treatment condition. In short, we could find that the first‐to‐
14

See Harding (1976).
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grasp effect is the unconditional primary explanation for how panels award the found item, i.e., there are
no interaction effects for what Red and Blue do. For such a conclusion, the panels could decide 77%,
70%, 100%, and 93% of time to award X to the person who has property in Y, with the proviso that the
person who has property in Y, according to the panels, is the participant who first grasps Y.
Case (2): Instead of strongly deciding in favor of Blue, the panels could decide strongly in favor
of Red; i.e., we could find that the avatar who sorts the tokens (Red) matters except when three
conditions are true in “Blue’s box‐Blue first grasps the box”: Blue (a) first grasps the box, (b) possesses
the box, and (c) finds the purple token. If this is true, then we could expect a small drop, say a 7‐
percentage point swing from 77% Red to 70% Red, when moving from “Red’s box‐Red first grasps the
box” to “Red’s box‐Blue first grasp the box” treatment conditions. In other words, the remaining
treatment condition looks just like Figure 4(b), a small swing away from Red as compared to panel (a)
and a large swing away from Blue as compared to panel (c). In short, the interaction effects are strong,
i.e., the first‐to‐grasp effect is highly conditional on what Red and Blue do. Moreover, we have strong
evidence to conclude that the common reason for why the panels award the found item to Red in three
of the four treatment conditions is that the proposed rule for settling disputes is wrong. The common
feature to all three treatment conditions is that Red sorts the tokens, and so the work that Red does
sorting the tokens explains how the panels decided the dispute. The fourth treatment condition thus
has the potential to completely reverse the interpretation of the original results.
Case (3): Finally, we could find something in the middle of Cases (1) and (2). As a benchmark,
splitting the difference between Case (1) and Case (2) would result in an Observer panel split of 35% for
Red and 65% for Blue. Such a result would mean that the first to grasp the box remains key to who has
property in the box in all four treatment conditions, but that it also matters some that the experimenter
tells the participants that the box is Red’s because Red is the person responsible for sorting the tokens.
In short, the first‐to‐grasp effect is robust, but the interaction effects for what Red and Blue do are not
inconsequential. For such a conclusion, the panels could decide 77%, 70%, 100%, and 65% of time to
award X to the person who has property in Y, with the proviso that the person who has property in Y,
according to the panels, is the participant who first grasps Y, but it also matters to a minority of panels
that Red, as the sorter of tokens, is named in the instructions as the owner of the box.
Figure 5 reports all of the Observer panel decisions for each of the four possible scenarios.15 The
top‐left bar graph, when both Red and Blue claim the purple token, is directly comparable to the three
panels as the bottom‐left corner in Figure 4. Eleven of the twenty Red‐Blue pairs are in conflict about
who can say, “The purple token is mine.”16 The results fall nearly in between Case (1) and Case (2)
above. Nearly two‐thirds of the Observer panels award the purple token to Blue, but one‐third of them
award the found item to Red. It matters to some that the instructions say that the box is Red’s because
Red is sorting the token. The simultaneous interpretation, given the design of the experiment, is that it
takes the trinity of first grasping Y, possession of Y, and finding X in Y to eliminate the minority effect of
Red’s work on sorting the tokens [64% for Blue in the top‐left panel Figure 5 vs. 100% for Blue in Figure
4(c)].

15

Like with the three other treatment conditions, approximately half of the pairs are not in conflict (Wilson 2020,
ch. 8).
16
This is consistent with the prior results in which disputes arise 65%, 50%, and 50% of the time.
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Figure 5. Observer Panel Decisions for the “Red’s box‐Blue first grasps the box” Treatment Condition

Even though 64‐100% of Observer panels robustly award the found item to the person who has
property in the item’s container (provided the person is the first to grasp the box in this experiment),
the final treatment condition also demonstrates how teasing out the final 0‐36% is a nontrivial task.
Possession of Y and finding X jointly matter as the 23% minority in “Red’s box‐Red first grasps the box”
testifies. But the 36% minority in “Red’s box‐Blue first grasps the box” also matters in that the sorting
task interacts with the claim in the instructions that the box is Red’s (in a way that the claim in the
instructions doesn’t seem to matter in the “Blue’s box‐Red first grasps the box” treatment condition).
There is no minority in the “Blue’s box‐Blue first grasps the box”. 100% of the panels award the
purple token to Blue. In the “Red’s box‐Red first grasps the box,” however, 77%, not 100%, of the
panels award the purple token to Red. Since in both treatments the same agent who owns the box is
the person who grasps it first, the difference in results for the two treatments seems to indicate the
effect of awarding the purple to token to the finder, which is always Blue. The finder matters to one out
of four three‐judge panels.
5. Conclusions
The final treatment condition of the 2 x 2 experimental design is crucial for understanding the
entire experiment, for it has the power to either rule in or rule out the main hypothesis. The final
treatment also demonstrates the complexity of the problem, even in a stylized, controlled experiment
while simultaneously demonstrating the strength of the proposed rule for settling found property
disputes. The simple rule–if A has property in Y, then A has property in X in Y–is indeed ecologically
rational in that supermajorities of observers (77%, 70%, 100%, and 64%) follow it in awarding X to A.
The broad findings of the experiment indicate that the court’s decision in Durfee v. Jones runs counter to
how a large supermajority of people think property should work. One conclusion from an experiment of
counterfactual conditions is that the windy road of precedent in the common law may have developed
in an undesirable direction from the original British cases of Armory and Bridges to the subsequent
American cases of McAvoy and Durfee.
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The first concern of economics readers is whether the proposed abstract rule incentivizes
behavior such that the value generated from finding lost items in the future exceeds the forgone costs
of doing so. And the law and economics reader’s first instinct is to say that the rule appears to
disincentivize finders from bringing lost items to the light of day, thereby decreasing the chance of
returning lost items to their owners. It may be true that we cannot rely on the good hearts of finders to
do the right thing and bend over to pick up something on the floor. But there is more at stake than
simply bringing lost items back into use. For if the public is unsure on the rule for awarding found items,
or worse, if courts articulate rules that run counter to how people actually think about such a problem,
there may be more costly disputes like Jackson v. Steinberg to resolve in the future. The mind also
matters in the long run. Bowen’s first impulse was to offer Quinn $10 of the $100 in the envelope she
found in Bowen’s facility. Paying a reward to finders sounds like a good incentivizing addition to the
general rule. It’s also an excellent idea for further research to explore whether more than 70‐77% of
panels award the item according to the abstract rule when the finder also receives 10% of the value.
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Appendix
Welcome (page 1)
This is an experiment in the economics of decision making. The instructions are simple, and if you follow
them carefully and make good decisions you can earn a considerable amount of money which will be
paid to you in CASH at the end of the experiment.
In this experiment people navigate in a 3‐D virtual world with a first‐person point of view. You can move
around the environment by using the arrow keys: ←, →, ↑, and ↓. Hit each key once.
To change your view of the world, move your mouse back to look down and forward to look up. Do this
now.
If you have any questions at any point in the instructions, please raise your hand.
Press the “i” key to show and hide the mouse cursor to continue to the next page of instructions.
Player Types (page 2)
There are three types of participants in this experiment: a Red person, a Blue person, and 3 Observers.
Everyone will go through the instructions as both a Red person and a Blue person.
Box Dispenser (page 3)
Red’s task is to go to their box dispenser, pick up a box, empty its contents, and redeem the box’s
contents for money. Use the arrows to walk up to the box dispenser. When you are close enough, a box
will appear in your hands. Slightly move your mouse back to see the box in your hands. Then move your
mouse forward to straight ahead.
Press the “i” key to show and hide the mouse cursor to continue to the next page of instructions.
Sorting Station (page 4)
Now walk towards the sorting station table. When you walk up next to the table, you will automatically
lay the box down on the table. Tokens will then roll out of the box onto the table.
Sorting Station Continued (page 5)
Look down to see if you are holding a token. If you are not holding a token, walk up to the table to
automatically pick up a token.
If you are holding a yellow token, walk over to the yellow token bin and deposit the token in it. Each
yellow token that Red deposits generates $0.50 in earnings for Red.
If you are holding a black token, put it in the trash; it is worth nothing. You must deposit the black
tokens in the trash chute to advance the experiment.
Even though they are not shown here, a box may contain purple tokens. Each purple token that is
deposited in the purple token bin generates $25.00 in earnings.
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Once all the tokens have been deposited, go back to the bench and pick up the box.
Transfer Box (page 6)
Red will then give their box to Blue on the other side of the wall. Blue’s job is to clean and sell the box
for Red. Blue will receive a portion of the proceeds for selling the box and will then return the rest of the
proceeds to Red.
Blue Person (page 7)
You are now going through the experiment from Blue’s point of view. Your task is to clean Red’s box for
them and to sell it for money. Take the box over to the wash station now.
Once the box is clean, take the box over to the cleaned box table to sell it to the computerized robot.
The robot will buy the cleaned box from you.
Money (page 8)
The robot will put money down on the table. Pick up the money. $0.50 is for Red. Blue can keep $1.50
for cleaning and selling the box for Red. Walk over to Red now to split the money.
Summary (page 9)
Red now starts the process over.
In this experiment, you are the Red person [Blue person/an Observer]. Observers will earn money later
in the experiment. Their [their/your] task right now is to observe Red and Blue.
[Red and Blue only] To help you get your bearings in the virtual world, the monitor on your right displays
a bird’s eye view of your avatar. [Red, however, is blocked from seeing anything on the other side of the
wall.]
This is the end of the instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and a monitor will
come by to answer them. If you are finished with the instructions, please click the Start button. The
instructions will remain on your screen until the experiment begins. We need everyone to click the Start
button before we can begin the experiment.
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